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farm-level data
The paper evaluates the 2000-2006 Rural Development 
Plan of the Lazio Region. It applies a difference in dif-
ference analysis to a dataset composed of data from the 
V and VI agricultural census, and administrative data 
about rural development payments. The total sample is 
composed by 46,021 farms. The empirical analysis shows 
that farms receiving rural development payments (treat-
ment) increased their competitive capability more than 
those with no payments (control group). The data sup-
ported the hypothesis of a selection effect: farms with 
higher competitive capability were more likely to obtain 
payments. A regression approach confirmed the results 
of the non-parametric difference in difference analysis. 
1. Introduction
The quantitative evaluation of rural development programs is an open ques-
tion for academics and policy makers (Bradley et al. 2010). A recent report by the 
European Court of Auditors (Special Report 12, 2013) questioned the effectiveness 
of the public intervention and concluded that the current monitoring indicator 
data on results are not reliable enough to prove that that the “EU budget allocated 
for rural development policy are well spent”. Recent literature supported the con-
clusion that more work is needed for an evidence-based and result driven agricul-
tural and rural development policy (Hodge and Midmore 2008; Shaxon 2011).
This paper presents an empirical evaluation of the 2000-2006 Rural develop-
ment plan in the Lazio Region using farm-level data. The micro-economic 
from the V and VI Agricultural Censuses have been linked to an administra-
tive dataset of the rural development payments. The resulting informative base 
allowed us to assess the impact of payments at individual level and then use a 
«difference in difference analysis». A regression approach is used to confirm 
the results from the non-parametric estimation.
The micro-economic approach to policy evaluation is well known in the 
literature (Buysse et al. 2011). The contribution of this paper lies in the unique 
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panel data from two censuses (2000 and 2010) and in the original perfor-
mance indicator, based on the analysis of the emergent strategy of individual 
farms (Russo and Sabbatini 2005, Sabbatini 2008).
The objective of the analysis is to assess if the rural development payments 
do achieve a statistically significant impact on the strategic positioning of 
Lazio farms and in describing such impact. 
2. Methodology
The paper applies a ‘difference in difference analysis’ to a panel of 46.021 
farms from the Lazio region. The dataset is composed of data from the V and VI 
agricultural censuses and from the administrative archives of rural development 
payments from the 2000-2006 Rural Development Plan.1 The study sample is de-
fined by the intersection set of the two censuses: a deterministic match identi-
fied the farmers that are in both datasets. The sample represents the 47,6% of the 
number of farms in the 2010 Census. The sample is not representative because it 
excludes all farms that for whatever reasons were registered under different farm-
er names. Those exceptions may include relevant cases (such as farm transmis-
sion and generation turnover) or simply collection errors.  Although the sample 
is not representative, the sheer size of it allows us to draw conclusions of general 
interest. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the sample.
The difference in difference analysis compares the variation in a set of 
performance indicators between two groups: one is subjected to a treatment 
(the study group) and the other one is not (the control group) (e.g., Cook and 
Campbell 1979, Meyers 1995). To the purpose of this paper, the treatment is 
the receiving of a rural development payment. The performance indicators are 
the Index of competitive capability (ICC) and the Index of interaction with the 
external environment (IIE). The two indicators are obtained from the classifi-
cation algorithm of the strategic typology by Russo and Sabbatini (2005) and 
are calculated from the factor scores obtained from an iterated multiple corre-
spondence analysis (MCA). The Authors used MCA and cluster analysis to de-
fine strategy profiles of Italian agricultural farms. The MCA factors obtained 
in the process can be used as coordinates to place farms in a ‘strategy space’ 
and measure the distance of each observation from the profile centroids. The 
location of the observation in the strategy space can be used to characterized 
and describe the farm strategy through the relative distance from each cen-
troid. Such description is defined as the farm’s strategic positioning. 
1 The data are courtesy of the Department of Agriculture of the Lazio Region, which provi-
ded an anonymous dataset based our specifications.
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The MCA factors of the strategic typology are defined by linear combina-
tion of census variables, which can be interpreted as the ‘underlying socio-
economic drivers’ of farms’ emergent strategies (Russo, Sabbatini 2005). The 
interpretation of the MCA factors allows the researchers to describe the stra-
tegic positioning using economic concepts.  The first MCA factor is the ICC 
and it is associated with farm’s economic and physical size, market orientation 
and human capital. Farms with high values of ICC, on average, exhibit higher 
capital investment (both in farmland, livestock and mechanization), market a 
higher percentage of total production (self-consumption is marginal) and have 
better education. The farms with high values of ICC are not necessarily more 
competitive, but on average are expected to be more likely to face competition. 
Such expectation is driven by the assumption that, in equilibrium, large finan-
cial investments in market-oriented firms are rational only if the farm is able 
to withstand competition. The IIE is obtained from the second factor, which 
is associated with high level of relational goods, the adoption of PDO or PGI 






















Viterbo Mount. -              
Hills 9.861 7,0 7,7 64 28,9 3,1 0,5 13,2
Plains 1.046 15,1 16,6 63 20,7 4,2 0,3 6,6
Rieti Mount. 1.579 7,2 9,8 64 28,8 9,9 1,5 9,1
Hills 2.862 3,5 3,5 65 27,0 3,0 0,5 11,8
Plains -              
Roma Mount. 993 4,3 5,6 66 25,3 2,4 0,1 2,9
Hills 7.202 4,0 4,2 64 27,8 3,5 0,3 6,1
Plains 949 14,7 12,8 63 22,3 7,3 0,5 8,1
Latina Mount. 343 1,1 2,2 62 31,8 0,9 0,0 0,0
Hills 4.596 2,2 2,4 63 28,5 1,7 0,0 1,4
Plains 4.529 3,9 4,2 59 26,8 8,1 0,2 2,1
Frosinone Mount. 3.975 2,0 2,8 64 31,9 1,6 0,1 3,0
Hills 8.086 2,9 3,0 64 38,4 1,9 0,1 2,5
Plains -              
Lazio Total 46.021 4,6 5,1 64 29,9 3,5 0,3 6,3
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label, cooperative membership and off-farm employment. Farms with high 
values of IIE build value from the interaction with the external social and 
economic environment. Farms with low values of IIE focus on on-farm opera-
tions. The combination of the ICC and IIE defines the farm strategic position-
ing.  Table 2 reports mean values of the ICC and IIE by province.
Tab. 2. Mean values of ICC and IIE
Provincia ICC 2000 ICC 2010 Var. ICC IIE 2000 IIE 2010 var. IIE
Viterbo Mount.
Hills 0,139 -0,142 -0,281 0,170 -0,040 -0,210
Plains 0,565 0,041 -0,524 0,280 -0,167 -0,447
Rieti Mount. 0,191 0,021 -0,171 -0,062 -0,176 -0,114
Hills 0,070 -0,268 -0,338 0,158 -0,001 -0,159
Plains
Roma Mount. -0,162 -0,303 -0,141 0,102 -0,088 -0,190
Hills 0,001 -0,297 -0,298 0,174 -0,058 -0,231
Plains 0,472 0,077 -0,395 -0,047 -0,285 -0,238
Latina Mount. -0,354 -0,416 -0,062 0,239 0,004 -0,235
Hills -0,031 -0,392 -0,361 0,260 0,011 -0,250
Plains 0,331 0,034 -0,297 0,082 -0,150 -0,231
Frosinone Mount. -0,227 -0,460 -0,234 0,129 -0,069 -0,199
Hills 0,042 -0,336 -0,378 0,036 -0,136 -0,171
Plains
Lazio 0,074 -0,234 -0,309 0,132 -0,079 -0,211
Obviously, ICC and IIE do not capture the full scope of the second pillar 
of the CAP. Rural development policies pursue a broad set of objectives in-
cluding environmental preservation, social inclusion, identity preservation and 
many others. Such general goals are not measured by changes in the strategic 
positioning, because the metric is focused on the individual farm without con-
sidering the systemic effects of the policy. Nevertheless, the impact of Rural 
Development Payments on competitiveness and economic integration is still 
an interesting study question, because such objectives were mentioned explic-
itly in the Lazio Rural Development Plan 2000-2006 (p. 21 of the document). 
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Consequently, this analysis cannot be considered as an encompassing evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of rural development policies. It is an assessment of 
how such policies can impact farms’ strategies and change them in a direction 
that is compatible with public objectives.
Comparing individual data from the 2000 and 2010 censuses it is possible 
to measure the difference in the values of the performance indicators IIC and 
IIE before and after receiving rural development payments (treatment).2 The 
variations in the values of the farms that did not obtain payments are used as 
2 Clearly, the comparison between two censuses may reflect factors that are specific of one of 
the two points in time. Nevertheless, the use of short panels is a common approach in the 
literature due to data availability.
Fig. 1. Strategic positioning of farm receiving rural development payments (beneficiaries) 
and farm not receiving rural development payments (non beneficiaries) in 2000 and 2010
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counterfactual (control group). Such difference in difference analysis allows us 
to measure the impact of rural development policies on farmers’ strategic po-
sitioning. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the analysis. The diagram repre-
sents a two-dimension strategy space where the two axes are the ICC and the 
IIE. The position of each observation in the strategy space defines the stra-
tegic positioning of the farm. In the diagram, four groups are placed in the 
strategy space: the treatment group (i.e., farmers who received rural develop-
ment payments, the ‘beneficiaries’) and the control group (i.e., farmers who 
did not receive payments, the ‘non beneficiaries) before the treatment (in year 
2000) and after the treatment (year 2010). The coordinates of the four points 
were calculated using the average of IIC and IIE for each group. The difference 
in difference analysis tests if the change in the strategic positioning after treat-
ment is statistically significant.
3. Results 
The explorative analysis of the data set suggests a possible association be-
tween the value of the ICC before the treatment and the probability of receiv-
ing rural development payments. Figure 1, in fact, shows that beneficiaries 
exhibited, on average, a much higher value of ICC in year 2000. For a more 
detailed analysis, Figure 2 reports histograms representing the relative fre-
quencies of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by class of ICC values in year 
2000. In order to get a differentiation among the different measures in the ru-
ral development plan, the payments have been broken down according to the 
three axes of Lazio 2000-2006 program: efficiency (axis 1), diversification (axis 
2) and agro-environmental payments (axis 3). The graphs suggest that the dis-
tribution of the two groups is different.3
A formal t-test on the average ICC values of the two groups allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis of equality of the means at 99% confidence level.4 
This outcome has major implications. It suggests that farms with higher com-
petitive capability might have easier access to rural development policy. Fur-
thermore, it implies that the distribution between the control and treatment 
groups might not be random. 
3 This classification was obtained from the official RD plan by Regione Lazio, availa-
ble at http://www.agricoltura.regione.lazio.it/agriweb/schede_informative_dettaglio.
php?id=69&idat=27 . Note that in 2000-2006 agri-environmental payments were included 
in Axis 3 (p.82 of the document), unlike 2007-2013 plan where they were placed in Axis 2.
4 The t statistic for the test on Axis 1 was t(46019) = 59,361, for Axis 2 was t(46019) = 
16,862, for Axis 3 was t(46019) =8,413
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For controlling the endogenous selection, the sample was broken down 
into three classes based on the value of the ICC: low, medium and high com-
petitive capability denoted as LCC, MCC and HCC respectively (Russo and 
Sabbatini 2005). Figure 3 reports the relative frequencies of beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries for each ICC class. A χ2 test allows us to reject the null hy-
pothesis of absence of association between the two variables.5
The association between the value of IIE at 2000 and the access to rural 
development payments is not supported by empirical evidence at 99% confi-
dence level. Only in the case of Axis 1, the beneficiaries showed a significantly 
lower average value of IIE. These results suggest that it is advisable to control 
for the starting values of the ICC when testing for association between rural 
development payments and changes in the strategic positioning, while control-
ling for the initial values of IIE is not necessary.
Figure 4 reports the distribution of the relative frequencies of beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries by class of variation of ICC (2010 with respect to 2000) 
and ICC class. The empirical analysis supports the assumption that rural de-
5 The χ2(2) statistics for the three cases are 3.013,8; 175,3 and 1.321,823 for Axes 1, 2 and 3 
respectively.
Fig. 2. Sample distribution by values of ICC: Beneficiaries and Non-beneficiaries (Relative 
frequencies, year 2000)
Axis	  1	  (efficiency)	   Axis	  2	  (diversification)	   Axis	  3	  (agro-­‐environ.)	  
Fig. 3. Relative frequencies of beneficiaries and non-benefeciaries by ICC class (year 2000)
Axis	  1	  (efficiency)	   Axis	  2	  (diversification)	   Axis	  3	  (agro-­‐environ.)	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velopment payments have – on average – a positive effect on the competitive 
capability of farms. Between year 2000 and 2010, the average ICC value de-
creased by 0.312 for the non-beneficiaries and by 0.221 for the beneficiaries. 
The difference is statistically significant at 99% confidence level. Rural devel-
opment payments are associated with a slower decline of the competitive capa-
bility, compared to the national trend.6 
The effects of rural development payments on the IIE are more ambigu-
ous. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the variations in IIE for beneficiar-
ies and non-beneficiaries. The data allow us to reject at 99% confidence level 
the null hypothesis of equality of means between the two groups only as far 
as Axis 1 is concerned. When Axes 2 and 3 are considered, the differences in 
mean values are not statistically significant. 
Sample segmentation according to ICC classes confirms the ambiguous re-
sults. The effect of rural development payments on the IIE mean value of LCC 
6 By construction, the ICC is normalized with respect to the Italian average in each year. 
Consequently, a negative variation over time can be interpreted as a decline of the relative 
competitive capability with respect to the mean.
Fig. 4. Relative frequencies of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by class of variation of 
ICC and class of ICC (2000)
Axis	  1	  (efficiency)	   Axis	  2	  (diversification)	   Axis	  3	  (agro-­‐environ.)	  
Full	  sample	  
LCC	   LCC	  
MCC	  
HCC	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farms is not statistically significant for any Axes. The mean IIE value of MCC 
farms is significantly lower when they receive payments from Axes 3 (the t 
statistic is 5,614) and it is not significantly different for Axis 1 and 2. Rural de-
velopment payments from Axes 1 and 3 have a significant and positive effect 
on the IIE of HCC farms. Axis 2 payments are not associated with any signifi-
cant effect on mean values. Table 3 summarizes the test results.
4. A regression approach
The difference in difference analysis is a non-parametric approach that 
does not rely on distributional assumptions about variables. However, it fails 
to control for covariates that can explain the underlying economic behavior. 
Reduced-form regressions can provide additional insight into the effects of ru-
ral development payments on farms’ strategic positioning and into the deter-
minants of policy access. Table 4 reports the results from a probit estimation 
of the conditional probability of obtaining a rural development payment. The 
dependent variable Policy is a dummy equal to 0 if the farm did not obtain 
any payment and 1 otherwise.
Fig. 5. Relative frequencies of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by class of variation of IIE 
and class of ICC (2000)






The probit regression confirms the selection issue. Firms with higher ICC 
in 2000 were more likely to have access to rural development payments. The 
value of IIE at 2000 is negatively associated with the dependent variable – af-
ter controlling for the effects of all other variables – although the marginal 
probability is remarkably lower than the one from ICC. 
The regression results are consistent with expectations: young and educated 
farmers are more likely to obtain payments. Gender is not significant. Spatial 
distribution can explain the probability of access: farms located in mountain ar-
eas (where Axis 3 had special programs) and in the northern part of the region 
(where extension services are more effective) are more likely to receive payments.
The results suggest that the access to the policy required a non-negligible 
level of human capital and efficient support and services. Such barriers can 
explain partially the low rate of access to payments.
Table 5 reports the results of reduced-form regressions of the variations 
in ICC and IIE on a set of explanatory variables including: dummy variables 
identifying the beneficiaries of payments (Axis 1, 2 and 3), the initial strategic 
positioning (the values of ICC and IIE at year 2000), demographic variables 
(age, gender and education) and a set of dummy variables describing the spa-
tial location of the farm (province and altitude). To account for possible het-
eroschedasticity, White robust standard errors were computed. 
The regression results support the hypothesis that rural development pay-
ments increase the competitive capability of Lazio farms: the coefficients as-
Tab. 3. Summary results of the t-tests comparing the mean values of variations of ICC and 
IIE (2000-2010) of beneficiaries  (μB) and non-beneficiaries (μNB)*
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
LCC
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
MCC
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: reject H0, μB<μNB
HCC ICC: reject H0, μB>μNBIIE: reject H0, μB>μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: reject H0, μB>μNB
Total 
sample
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: reject H0, μB>μNB
ICC: reject H0, μB>μNB
IIE: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB
ICC: fail to reject H0, 
μB=μNB IIE: fail to reject 
H0, μB=μNB
* The null hypothesis H0 is equality of the mean values. The confidence level is 99%
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sociated to the three dummy variables Axis 1, 2 and 3 are significant and 
positive. As expected the payments from Axis 3 have a smaller coefficients, 
because agri-environmental payments did not require (or finance) new on-
farm investments or change in the business strategy. On average, after con-
trolling for all other variables, payments from Axis 1 reduce the expected 
value of the IIE. The impact of the other Axes is not significant. The negative 
coefficient suggests that payments from Axis 1 – on average and keeping eve-
rything else constant – are expected to reduce the degree of integration with 
the external economic environment. The result can be explained by the very 
nature of the measures. They supported on-farm investments (such as inno-
vation or processing plants) or provided incentives to full-time farming and 
labor specialization (supporting generation turnover or life-long learning). 
Consequently, the farmers receiving payments have incentive to focus on on-
farm operations and reduce off-farm employment, reducing the expected IIE. 
Tab. 4. Probit estimation of the conditional probability of obtaining a rural development 
payment
Dep. variable: Policy 
(being beneficiary of a payment of any kind) 
Likelihood Ratio Test: 5889.94   p.val.: 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Error T-ratio Marg. Prob.
ICC_2000 0.686 0.014 50.486 0.071
IIE_2000 -0.138 0.020 -6.825 -0.014
VT 0.626 0.030 20.705 0.065
RI 0.617 0.035 17.598 0.064
RM 0.307 0.033 9.407 0.032
LT 0.018 0.039 0.474 0.002
Gender 0.035 0.021 1.647 0.004
Age -0.017 0.001 -17.755 -0.002
Mountains 0.067 0.033 2.064 0.007
Plains -0.063 0.031 -2.011 -0.007
Bachelor degree 0.786 0.081 9.690 0.082
High school 0.477 0.074 6.479 0.050
Middle school 0.227 0.073 3.132 0.024
Elementary school 0.048 0.071 0.675 0.005
Constant -1.079 0.101 -10.641
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Axes 2 and 3 do not exhibit such direct correlation and the effects on IIE are 
not significant.
The coefficients of the socio-demographic variables are consistent with 
expectations. Young farmers are expected to achieve better performance in 
terms of ICC and IIE compared to old farmers. Education is positively asso-
ciated with the variations of ICC and negatively associated to changes in IIE 
(because educated farmers have a higher reservation salary and are more keen 
to off-farm employment). Gender exhibits a negative correlation with variation 
of ICC but has no significant impact in IIE.
Tab. 5. Regression of variations in ICC (ΔICC) and IIE (ΔIIE) on a vector of explanatory varia-
bles
dep. variable: ΔICC  
adj. R2: .4281 
F-stat: 2027.6  p.val: 0.000
dep. variable_ ΔIIE 
adj. R2: .4754










Axis 1 0.437 0.019 23.560 0.000 -0.176 0.011 -16.360 0.000
Axis 2 0.430 0.067 6.416 0.000 -0.073 0.031 -2.363 0.018
Axis 3 0.281 0.012 23.270 0.000 -0.004 0.008 -0.507 0.612
ICC_2000 -0.635 0.005 -137.900 0.000 -0.072 0.003 -23.540 0.000
IIE_2000 -0.092 0.004 -21.300 0.000 -0.813 0.005 -179.200 0.000
Gender -0.068 0.005 -14.910 0.000 -0.005 0.004 -1.123 0.261
Age -0.010 0.000 -37.720 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -69.850 0.000
Mountain 0.044 0.006 7.613 0.000 -0.013 0.006 -2.101 0.036
Plains 0.151 0.008 18.080 0.000 -0.149 0.006 -24.120 0.000
Bachelor Degree 0.039 0.015 2.589 0.010 0.119 0.015 7.854 0.000
High School 0.015 0.011 1.317 0.188 0.093 0.010 8.866 0.000
Middle School 0.025 0.010 2.414 0.016 0.016 0.010 1.628 0.104
Elementary School 0.014 0.009 1.470 0.142 -0.039 0.009 -4.495 0.000
VT 0.140 0.006 22.480 0.000 0.066 0.006 10.990 0.000
RI 0.114 0.008 14.310 0.000 0.073 0.007 9.751 0.000
RM 0.067 0.006 10.900 0.000 0.028 0.006 4.694 0.000
LT 0.030 0.007 4.414 0.000 0.065 0.007 9.671 0.000
Constant 0.254 0.022 11.630 0.000 0.925 0.020 46.980 0.000
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Compared with the difference in difference approach, the regression ap-
proach requires stronger assumptions about error terms and functional forms. 
Consequently, the results can suffer of a misspecification bias. Nevertheless, re-
gressions consider explicitly a set of covariates allowing the researcher to control 
for exogenous determinants, unlike the non-parametric difference in difference 
form section 3.  The results of the two approaches are consistent: they both show 
a selection problem and support the hypothesis that rural development pay-
ments have a positive impact on the ICC. The effects on IIE are less clear.
5. Conclusions 
The analysis concludes that the 2000-2006 rural development policies of 
Lazio region had a significant impact and contributed to improve competitive 
capability. Beneficiaries achieved on average larger (or less negative) increments 
of ICC than non-beneficiaries with similar characteristics. Yet, critical issues 
emerged. The data suggested a selection effect: farmers with higher ICC in 2000 
were more likely to benefit from payments, especially from axis 1. This con-
firms the well-known result paradox: farmers who “need less” public supports 
are more likely to obtain it. Moreover, the access barrier for the least competitive 
farms has indicated that the rural development policy was more effective in fa-
voring and strengthening the strategies of already competitive farms rather than 
helping inefficient producers to invest in competitive capacity. 
Noticeably, the estimated effect on the ICC of payments from Axis 3 is 
significantly lower than the other two Axes. This result is consistent with ex-
pectations, because agro-environmental payments did not require farmers to 
adopt business-development plans.
The effect of rural development payments on the IIE is ambiguous. The 
econometric model suggests that after controlling for starting conditions, de-
mographics and spatial location, Axes 2 and 3 have no significant effect. The 
overall net effect of the payments from Axis 1 is negative, meaning that such 
transfers might give incentives to business model that are focused on on-farm 
operations. Only the HCC group showed the ability of using payments to de-
velop integrated business models.
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